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RAVIN v. STATE
suicide. The same court went on to state that, in the absence of a
suicide-attempt criminal statute, the patient refusing treatment could be
free from all criminal conduct. Therefore, in a jurisdiction with a statute
prohibiting the aiding of suicide, but with no statute against the attempt,
a physician could be subject to arrest; while the patient who requested
the euthanasia is free from such a threat. It would appear the physician
would be subject to criminal charges, in those jurisdictions prohibiting
the attempt or aiding of a suicide, regardless of the criminal status of the
patient. In the future, states which desire to legalize euthanasia not only
must release physicians from homicide liability, but also from liability
extending from criminal suicide-aiding laws; in order to avoid a catastrophic conflict.
CONCLUSION

The criminal laws concerning the suicide act and attempt have never
been numerous, while those prohibiting the aiding of suicide are more
widespread. In recent years, at least four states have abolished the
suicide act and attempt as crimes.4 9 In the few states retaining such
violations, there have been no recent prosecutions for these crimes.
Granted the mental state of many suicides, it would be doubtful whether
the danger of criminal liability would be an effective deterrent. However, the laws concerning aid to suicides do punish conduct which is
not in the public interest and, as such, these laws should be retained and
not removed; as, for the most part, the laws dealing with the suicide
act and attempt have been.
DONALD

M. WRIGHT

Ravin v. State: Marijuana Use in the Home
Protected by Right of Privacy
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of Alaska recently announced a progressive,
enlightened and unprecedented ruling in Ravin v. State.' The extensive
well-written opinion, declaring that possession and use of marijuana in
the home by adults is protected by the constitutional right of privacy, is
a vanguard among the cases in which the right of privacy has been
49. New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota and South Dakota.

1. 537 P.2d 494 (Alas. Sup. Ct. 1975).
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argued, heretofore unsuccessfully. The Alaska court is the first court in
the nation to rule on the constitutional arguments which underlie the use
and possession of marijuana in the home.
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the trend of public opinion
and policy favors dissolving the prohibition of marijuana. Recent tests of
independent medical associations and reports of various organizations
indicate that the state may not have a compelling interest to protect
society or the individual from a natural substance which has less potential for harm than alcohol.
Ravin, the petitioner, attacked the constitutionality of Alaska's statute
prohibiting possession of marijuana by asserting, inter alia, that the State
had violated his right to privacy under both the federal and Alaska
constitutions. Petitioner contended that his constitutionally protected
right to privacy compels the conclusion that the State of Alaska is
prohibited from penalizing the private possession and use of marijuana.
Ravin contended that there exists under the federal and Alaska
constitutions a fundamental right to privacy, the scope of which is
sufficiently broad to encompass and protect the possession of marijuana
for personal use. Given this fundamental constitutional right, the State
would then have the burden of demonstrating a compelling state interest
in prohibiting possession of marijuana. Petitioner further argued that the
evidence demonstrates that marijuana is a relatively innocuous substance, particularly as compared with other less-restricted substances
(e.g. alcohol), and nothing even approaching a compelling state interest
was proven by the State.2 Ravin urged the court to recognize that
whatever harm resulting from marijuana use is far outweighed by the
negative aspects of enforcement. He noted that while over 400,000
persons were arrested for marijuana related crimes in 1973, 81% of
them had no previous criminal records.'
The Alaska court traced the constitutional origins of the right to
privacy by reviewing the United States Supreme Court cases which have
shaped a fundamental constitutional right of privacy which had not been
enumerated by the framers of the Constitution: Griswold v.
Connecticut,4 a modem recognition of the existence of "zones of privacy;" Stanley v. Georgia,5 a reaffirmation that "a man's home is his
castle;" ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton;6 an emphatic statement that the
protection afforded by Stanley was restricted to the home; and Roe v.
Wade, 7 where the right to privacy was based on the right to personal
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 497.
Id. at 508.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
413 U.S. 49 (1973).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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autonomy. The Alaska court then discussed the recent amendment to
the Alaska Constitution, which placed the right of privacy among the
specifically enumerated rights." The privacy amendment was intended to
give recognition and protection to the home which has a special significance in Alaska. This was an important element in the court's reasoning
used in reaching its conclusion.
The court examined the cases in other jurisdictions which have considered the privacy argument,9 and the Supreme Court holdings which
involve the sanctity of the home. 10 It concluded that the citizens of the
State of Alaska have a basic right to privacy in their -homes under
Alaska's constitution. This right to privacy would encompass the possession and ingestion of substances such as marijuana in a purely personal,
non-commercial context in the home unless the State could meet its
substantial burden and show that proscription of possession of marijuana in the home is supportable by achievement of a legitimate state
interest."
The Alaska court also examined extensive evidence, consisting of
expert witnesses familiar with various medical and social aspects of
marijuana use and numerous written reports and books.' 2 It found
that there is no firm evidence that marijuana, as presently used in this
country, is generally a danger to the user or to others, but added that
neither is there conclusive evidence that it is harmless. 1" The court
concluded from the evidence presented that, although the state
has a legitimate concern with avoiding the spread of marijuana use
to adolescents, as well as a legitimate concern with the problem of
driving under the influence of marijuana, these interests are insufficient
to justify4 intrustions into the rights of adults in the privacy of their own

homes. '

The Alaska court strictly qualified its opinion by stating that neither
the federal nor Alaska constitution affords protection for the buying or
selling of marijuana, nor absolute protection for its use or possession in
public. Also unprotected is possession at home of amounts of marijuana
indicative of intent to sell rather than just for personal use.'"
The court also wished to make it clear that they were not condoning
the use of marijuana in conjunction with its holding that possession of
8. Alas. Const. Art. I § 22.

"The right of the people to privacy is recognized and

shall not be infringed."
9. 537 P.2d at 501-502.
10. Id. at 503-504.
11. Id. at 504.
12. Id. at 504, n.43.

13. Id. at 508.
14. Id. at 511.
15. Id.
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marijuana by adults at home for personal use is constitutionally protect16
ed.
BACKGROUND

The broad basis for the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Ravin v.
State is founded on the United States Supreme Court's pronouncements
17
on the right of privacy which initiated with Griswold v. Connecticut.
The subsequent decisions expanded this concept in two lines of cases:
one involving the right of privacy in the home, and the other concerning
the right of privacy for the individual. A review of these major cases will
provide an insight to the Alaska court's rationale in Ravin.
RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN THE HOME

In Griswold, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional, a
state statute which barred the dispensation of birth control information
to married persons. The Court concluded that because of the nature of
the intimate marital relationship and the sanctity of the home, state
intrusion to enforce the statute was unwarranted. The United States
Supreme Court first recognized the existence of constitutional zones of
privacy in this case.
Four years later, the Supreme Court, in Stanley v. Georgia,1 8 combined the concept of the privacy of the home, derived from Griswold,
with peripheral first amendment rights to invalidate a state statute that
prohibited possession of obscene materials in one's own home.
Although the Court had held previously that obscenity is not protected by the first amendment, 19 Stanley did not disturb this holding. In
Stanley, however, the distinction between commercial distribution of
obscene matter and the private enjoyment of it at home was the deciding
factor; and the Court emphasized that the right involved in viewing
obscenity takes on an added dimension when done in the privacy of the
home. 0
The Stanley holding was subsequently refined by the companion cases
of Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton2 ' and United States v. Orito,22 two
cases involving commercial obscenity. The Supreme Court explicity
rejected the comparison of a theater to a home in ParisAdult Theatre I,
and found a legitimate state interest in regulating the use of obscene
16. Id.

17.
18.
19.
20.

381
394
See,
394

U.S. 479 (1965).
U.S. 557 (1969).
Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
U.S. at 564.

21. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
22. 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
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matter in local commerce and places of public accommodation.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, stated that the
privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the
home and that Stanley v. Georgia, which was decided on this basis "...
was hardly more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is his cas-

tle.'

"23

The fact that Stanley's activities took place in the privacy of his home
is the reason for the added dimension in the case, the Supreme Court
noted. They also pointed out that there exists a "myriad" of activities
which may be lawfully conducted in the privacy and confines of the
home, but may be prohibited in public.24 The added dimension was also
present, not only because the home is a particularly intimate locus of
activity; but also because the activities involved implicate individuals'
"beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations," focal val25
ues of the "right to be let alone."1
RIGHT OF PRIVACY FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

While Stanley v. Georgia and ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton focused
on the home as the locus where protected activity may occur; Eisenstadt
v. Baird26 and Roe v. Wade2 7 developed another of Griswold's primary
themes-the right of personal autonomy. In these cases, the Supreme
Court had to decide whether the Constitution protected the individual's
ability to make a decision crucial28 to his or her personal life, and whether
the State could limit that ability.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court held that Massachusetts'
statute permitting married persons to obtain contraceptives to prevent
pregnancy, but prohibiting distribution of contraceptives ,to single
persons for that purpose violates equal protection. The Court, after
discussing the right of privacy in Griswold, emphatically said that "...
if the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or begat a child."2 9
The Supreme Court -held in Roe v. Wade, that the Texas criminal
abortion statutes prohibiting abortions at any stage of pregnancy except
23. 413 U.S. at 66.
24. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142-143 (1973).
25. 394 U.S. at 564. The Court quoting with approval the famous dissent of Justice
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
26. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
27. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
28. Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 670, 693 (1973).

29. 405 U.S. at 453.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1975

5

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 [1975], Art. 16

168

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

to save the life of the mother are unconstitutional. In the discussion of
the right of privacy, it was found that the right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution. Only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental"
or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are included in this
guarantee of personal privacy. The Court concluded that this right of
privacy is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
0
not to terminate her pregnancy.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Roe, further explained what the right of privacy includes:
a catalogue of these rights includes customary, -traditional, and
time-honored rights, amenities, privileges, and immunities that come
within the sweep of the 'Blessings of Liberty' mentioned in the preamble to the Constitution. Many of them, in my view, come within
the meaning of the term 'liberty' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment.
First is the autonomous control over the development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality. These are
rights protected by the First Amendment -and in my view absolute.81
[Emphasis original]
In the context of these cases, the essence of privacy is the notion that
certain basic decisions about how one will conduct his or her lifewhether on a day-to-day basis or in a long-term sense-are reserved to
the individual. If the state wishes to place restrictions on these decisions,
it must show a compelling interest in relation to its police powers to do
SO.
TESTS USED TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN
INTEREST IS PROTECTED

The cases which have been previously discussed, point out a twopronged approach to use in viewing the right of privacy-first, that an
illegal activity may be protected when unwarranted state enforcement of
the prohibited activity would be an encroachment of the fundamental
right of privacy attached to the home; and second, the state must have a
compelling interest when intruding into personal decisions which comprise the constitutionally protected personal autonomy of the individual.
Several tests have been established by the Supreme Court and suggested by others which aid in the determination of whether the concept
of the right of privacy is broad enough to protect a particular interestsuch as possession and use of marijuana in the home.
The fundamental rights test is frequently used, and was first adopted
30. 410 U.S. at 153.
31. Id. at 210-11.
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to facilitate analysis of equal protection claims, excluding all but rights
which were deemed "fundamental."" The Supreme Court has already
identified in various cases a group of rights labeled as privacy rights.
The Court has denominated these rights as "fundamental" or "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty. '3 3 Under this test, only rights which
were classified as fundamental could claim any measure of constitutional
protection, and rights not labeled as such were thereby excluded.
The inherent ambiguity of the fundamentality test created problems,
since few human activities are definitely fundamental or nonfundamenof a right
tal. Such a standard is necessarily vague, and the classification
34
as fundamental or not is virtually outcome-determinative.
If a court determines that a privacy right is fundamental, the state
should have to show that its infringement is necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest. As stated by the United States Supreme Court: "Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the state may prevail only upon showing a subordinating
interest which is compelling. 3 5
The "rational basis" test is ordinarily applied when governmental
action interferes with an individual's freedom in an area which is not
characterized as fundamental. This test is not as stringent as the fundamentality test. In such cases it is necessary to determine whether the
legislative enactment has a reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.3 6
The current Supreme Court apparently has found the dichotomous
approach of the fundamentality test unworkable and has been reaching
for some middle ground. When a state classification has impinged on
certain nonfundamental personal interests, the Court has applied the
whether the
lower level rational-basis test more rigorously, examining
37
end.
state
legitimate
a
promote
fact
in
does
classification
In Roe v. Wade, 8 Justice Blackmun took a broad view of what
constitutes precedent for finding the right of privacy. Using the Supreme
Court cases which have involved privacy rights, Blackmun has sketched
a sphere of constitutionally protected rights, involving contraception,
home, family and the rearing of children. 9 He suggests that the underlying concerns of these cases should be consulted, rather than the specific
32. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-63.
33. Derived from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), cited in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).

34. 48 N.Y.U.L. REv.at 702.
-35. 410 U.S. at 155.

36.
37.
38.
39.

537 P.2d at 497.
Eisenstadt v.Baird, 405 U.S. 438.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at 704.
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holdings, when a privacy argument is advanced. In particular, does the
claimed right depend on values deemed important in those cases? Does
it commonly involve the home? Does it concern values associated with
the home, such as seclusion, intimacy or the pleasures of associating
with family or close friends? Is it a right of personal autonomy? More
particularly, does it involve autonomous decisions that shape an individual's personal life, whether in a long-term or short-term sense? 40 Questions of this nature should always be asked when attempting to determine whether a particular interest is constitutionally protected.
Another suggested test states that if a plaintiff or defendant can show
that the statute involved will not in fact promote evident and legitimate
state interests, the burden should be shifted to the state to identify its
legitimate interests, or to show that there is good reason to believe that
the measure will in fact achieve its intended purpose. To determine
whether the means chosen by the state are rationally related in fact to
the realization of a legitimate end, the court should use the "means
test.''41 The Alaska court used a variation of this test in Ravin.
All of these tests present guidelines which a court can use in determining whether a particular interest should be protected by the right of
privacy.
THE

RIGHT TO POSSESS MARIJUANA IN THE HOME

The similarity of possession and use of marijuana in the privacy of the
home and the possession of obscene matter in the home which was
involved in Stanley v. Georgia,42 leads to an analysis of whether the
nature of the use of marijuana is such that would serve as a compelling
state interest to intrude into the privacy of the -home to enforce the
prohibition against its use.
If an individual uses marijuana in his own home, his activity closely
resembles the conduct protected in Stanley. Although smoking
marijuana is not the same as viewing obscenity, The Supreme Court has
emphatically asserted that Stanley has nothing to do with the first
amendment. 43 Stanley traces the distinction between commercial and
private personal use and should be viewed as a supplement to the fourth
amendment, giving added protection to the values of seclusion and
repose centered around the home. Therefore, if Stanley protects a qualified right to engage in activity in the privacy of one's home legally,
which would be illegal if performed elsewhere; the right to use marijuana in such a manner should also, logically, be protected.
40. Id.
41. 48 N.Y.U.L. Rv.at 705.
42. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).

43. See, United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8"MM Film, 413,126 (1973).
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While the use of marijuana does not appear to be connected to
notions of family planning and homelife, the subject matter of some of
the major privacy decisions; it is connected with the ability to set one's
own lifestyle, which is associated with the right of personal autonomy.
Furthermore, when a "consenting adult" uses marijuana only to alter
his own consciousness and does not engage in antisocial behavior, he
indulges in autonomous conduct that does not affect others. In such
a situation, attention should be paid to the state's interest in interferto see if it is rationally related in fact to a valid
ing with his conduct,
44
public purpose.
A survey of the law in other jurisdictions demonstrates that there is
some concurrence with Alaska's finding that the right of privacy which
surrounds the home is broad enough to protect the use of marijuana in
the home.
The Hawaii Supreme Court decided in State v. Kanter,45 that a
legislative classification of marijuana as a "narcotic" was rational and
did not violate equal protection standards. However, two of the justices
wrote opinions which discussed the right to privacy. Justice Abe asserted
that a person does have a right to smoke marijuana, derived from the
"fundamental right of liberty to make a fool of himself." Abe
continued in a more serious vein that marijuana might be harmful to the
its use in the home without
user, but the state could not prohibit
46
showing harm to the general public.
Justice Levinson, in his dissent, found that the right to privacy
"guarntees to the individual the full measure of control over his own
personality consistent with the security of himself and others. '47 The
experiences generated by the use of marijuana are mental in nature, he
explained, and thus among the most personal and private experiences
possible. So long as conduct does not produce detrimental results, the
right of privacy protects the individual's conduct designed to affect these
inner areas of the personality. Levinson concluded that the State had
failed to show any harm to the user or to others from the private,
personal use of marijuana; so the statute infringed on the right to
personal autonomy.
In People v. Sinclair,48 a Michigan case, a conviction for possession of
marijuana was overturned by a unanimous court, though not on the
issue of right of privacy. Justice T. G. Kavanagh, rested his opinion on
the basic right of the individual to be free from government intrusions.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at 754.
53 Haw. 327, 493 P.2d 306, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
Id. at 336-37, 493 P.2d at 312.
Id. at 342, 493 P.2d at 315.
387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972).
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He found the marijuana possession statute to be ". . . an impermissible
intrusion on the fundamental rights to liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and is an unwarranted interference with the right to possess and
use private property."4 9 He noted the basic freedom of the individual to
be free to do as he pleases so long as his actions do not interfere with the
rights of his neighbor or of society. ". . . 'Big Brother' cannot, in the
name of public health, dictate to anyone what he can eat or drink or
smoke in the privacy of his own home." 5°
The Second Circuit recently handed down a decision affirming convictions for possession of two tons of marijuana with intent to distribute
it, but intimated that they might be receptive to the argument by the
proper party that the private possession and use of marijuana is protected by the right of privacy." 1 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has
held that any prison sentence whatsoever imposed for first offense possession of marijuana for personal use should be suspended.5 2
The American Bar Association, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals, and the Governing Board of the American
Medical Association all have recommended decriminalization of possession of marijuana. 55 In 1973, Oregon adopted a civil penalty of up to
$100 for a simple possession. Legislatures in Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine and Ohio passed civil penalty measures this year, indicating a trend toward decriminalization of simple possession of marijuana.54
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE

The decision handed down in Ravin v. State is one which has no
precedent in these United States. Ravin marked the first time that the
highest court of any state has held that a person has a constitutionally
guaranteed right to smoke marijuana in his own home. The Alaska
Supreme Court has offered. a model opinion, and has established concrete guidelines with which to challenge statutes, both federal and state,
which arbitrarily prohibit simple possession and use of marijuana, even
in the privacy of one's own home.
The petitioner Ravin has presented a successful argument, involving
the right to privacy, which is in line with major Supreme Court cases
using the same argument. The rationale of the Alaska court, upon which
49.

194 N.W.2d at 896.

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1973) at 352.
State v. Ward, 57 N.J. 75, 270 A.2d 1 (1970).
Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d at 512.

54. Nelson, Pot Smoking in Home Question on High Court Slate, Durham Morning

Herald, Sept. 11, 1975 at 22A.
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its conclusion is based, was adequately Substantiated by using the reasoning from pertinent Supreme Court opinions involving the right of
privacy. The court expressed its disapproval of the tests which have
been traditionally used to determine whether an interest should be protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion and devised a more
workable test which requires a "close and substantial" means-end relationship5 5'
The recent amendment to Alaska's constitution, which specifically
enumerated privacy as a fundamental right, especially in the situs of the
home, gave the necessary impetus to the court's decision that the right
of privacy is broad enough to protect simple possession and use of marijuana within the home. Since the decision dealt with the Alaska Constitution, and not the United States Constitution, it is, consequently, not
subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.
The court stated that there were two important limitations on this
facet of the right to privacy. First, the court is in agreement with the
Supreme Court which has strictly limited the Stanley guarantee to the
possession for purely private, noncommercial use in the home. And
secondly, this right must yield when it interferes in a serious manner
with the health, safety, rights and privileges of others or with the public
welfare. Also, no one has an absolute right to do things in the privacy of
56
his home which will affect himself or others adversely.
CONCLUSION
The protection afforded in Ravin is strictly confined to the home. The
fundamental right of privacy surrounding the home was deemed broad
enough to encompass the use of marijuana. However, only the confines
of the home offer such a protection. The buying or selling of marijuana
is not protected, neither is there protection for its use or possession in
public. Also unprotected are amounts of marijuana indicative of commercial purposes.57 Even qualified in this manner, the Ravin opinion
is a major breakthrough for the proponents of the decriminalization of
marijuana, whose main arguments have advocated use in the privacy
of one's own home.
The Supreme Court case of Stanley v. Georgia suggests that there is a
certain type of activity which, while socially disapproved, is not so
damaging to society as to justify state disruption of the seclusion of the
home. If Stanley is to be of any significant use in a context other than
obscenity-if it can be used to protect a range of activities of a similar
nature-the "privacy of the home" may prove to be a potent constitu55. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d at 498.
56. Id. at 504.
57. Id. at 511.
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tional right; as the Supreme Court of Alaska has shown in Ravin where
the right to privacy was expanded to even protect the use of marijuana.5 8
Therefore, state interest in invading the home to prevent the use of
marijuana must be motivated by some perceptible need to protect the
public at large or to protect the individual user against a genuine threat
to -his health and welfare; and no such interest was shown in this case.
In a recent law review article it was suggested that a society that
allows its citizens some freedom to pursue sensual happiness with minor
harm to themselves might choose a regulatory scheme similar to that
used for control of alcohol. It was further stated that
• . .the preferable solution is no doubt legislative and there are some
signs that reform is coming. But until that time close judicial scrutiny
of existing laws might at least afford some protection to what many
agree is a protectable interest: The right of an individual, in, the
privacy of ,his home, to indulge in conduct that is harmful, if at all,
only -to himself.5 9
The Supreme Court of Alaska should be commended for taking the
initial bold step in holding that the right of privacy which surrounds the
home is so dear as to protect even the possession and use of marijuana.
This opinion can be a model and can serve as a resource guide for
writing the privacy argument to include protection of private use of
marijuana in other jurisdictions.
JANET KNIGHT BREECE

Donaldson v. O'Connor: Constitutional Right to
Treatment for the Involuntarily Civilly Committed
I.

INTRODUCTION

The law has deemed it in the best interests of society to commit the
mentally ill. In effect, to remove a certain segment of the population that
is not able to adequately cope with the realities of day to day living. That
segment is so small, 1 and the line of proof between sanity and insanity
so nebulous, 2 that the individual liberties guaranteed to each citizen
within that group have become jeopardized.
58. 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. at 693.
59. Id. at 760.
1. In 1972, 404,000 patients were admitted to state mental institutions: 41.8 percent were involuntarily committed. Note, Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment
of the Mentally Ill, 87 HAav. L. REv. 1190, 1193 (1974).

2. The Supreme Court is not sure that "mental illness" can be defined easily: "As-
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